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Abstract 
Theories are a key part of the scientific process. How should we evaluate theories against               
evidence? The two traditional and most widespread approaches use single studies and            
qualitative reviews to evaluate theories, and more recently large-scale replications are used.            
We argue here that none of these approaches fits in with cumulative science tenets. We               
propose instead the use of online and transparent Community-Augmented Meta-Analyses          
(CAMAs). These are cumulative and open because they are built using all available data,              
with techniques available to prevent data overfitting and to statistically model methodological            
"noise". We provide counter-arguments for the most common complaints against using           
meta-analyses for theory evaluation. Finally, we come to conclude that CAMAs will highlight             
areas of uncertainty better than the alternatives, and could trigger a much needed shift              
towards a cumulative mindset both with respect to theory and data, leading us to do               
experiments and qualitative reviews differently. 
Keywords​: open science; cumulative science; theory adjudication; computational        
modeling; empirical research; meta-analyses; bias; large-scale replications 
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Introduction 
As scientists, we strive for generality, trying to see beyond individual data points and              
individual experiments. In this process, theories (ranging from broad frameworks to           
implemented models) are a key part of the scientific process. They are the tools we use to                 
capture observed patterns, and we (often) use the resulting viewpoint to generate new             
predictions. Given this crucial role, our theories need to be evaluated, updated, and in the               
case when there are competing accounts, compared. In this context, a key question arises:              
How should we evaluate theories against evidence, particularly in the age of the "replication              
crisis"? In this paper, we will argue that the traditional response to this question is at odds                 
with the current movement towards cumulative science.  
In what remains of this paper, we first describe two existing approaches, a traditional one               
which bases theory evaluation on single studies and qualitative reviews, in addition to a              
more recent one, based on large-scale replications. We will conclude that none of these fits               
in with cumulative science tenets. We then go on to propose a novel approach, based on                
community-augmented, open meta-analyses (CAMAs; Tsuji, Bergmann, & Cristia, 2014).         
We first discuss the ways in which this approach more closely fits the desiderata from               
cumulative science. We then turn to roadblocks to its application. In this process, it becomes               
obvious that the very way in which new data are being collected needs to be revisited. We                 
end with considerations as to how, in the future, we can "let the evidence decide". 
 
State of the art in theory evaluation 
In this section, we set up two approaches to theory evaluation, against which we will 
compare our own proposal. We take into account six stages of theory evaluation. The first 
we call conceptualization, and it relates to clarifying ideas and concepts, the scope of the 
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theory, its elements and mechanisms. The second is study selection, deciding which studies 
in the literature bear on a given theory or group of theories that are evaluated. Design space 
sampling refers to what types of procedures, stimuli, populations, etc. are relevant for that 
theory. These two steps together determine a corpus of data to be considered. At this point, 
we may want to check previous literature in terms of the quality of the data we believe they 
bring in. This step may be visited twice, once at the level of individual studies (checking, for 
instance, for evidence of selected reporting of results), and another time at the level of the 
whole body of literature (checking for publication bias). We are faced then with the next 
stage, Result integration, where we try to draw a comprehensive picture based on the 
constituted corpus of data. When doing so, we may need to control for study differences (for 
instance, if several different procedures should fall within the scope of a theory, and these 
lead to different results, what are we to conclude).  
 
Table 1: Stages when considering data for theory evaluation when using a single study              
(including large-scale replications), qualitative review, and CAMA approaches. 
Stage Single study Qualitative review CAMA 
Conceptualization not necessary crucial difficult 
Study selection irrelevant subjective systematic 
Design space 
sampling 
one point subjective as comprehensive 




impossible subjective bias at individual 
study and body of 
literature, power 
analysis 





impossible impossible moderator analysis, 
weighing 
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Single studies 
Probably the most common way in which theories are evaluated are by means of individual               
studies, where often one or two theories or hypotheses are set up to generate predictions on                
the specific experiment (which might be testing humans or a computational model) that is              
reported on, and then the data are taken to support only one of the hypotheses (so as not to                   
point fingers at others: Bergmann & Cristia, 2018; Bergmann, Cristia, & Dupoux, 2016). But              
this is obviously incorrect, the moment one considers the issue in the light of cumulative               
science. Indeed, a single study can never support or disprove a theory, for at least the                
following three reasons. The first two reasons can be considered as being of a practical               
nature, imposed by what a single study can assess.  
First, each study is very specific: it employs one experimental setting, including stimuli,             
implementation, and sample, and results may not generalize to other settings that vary along              
one or more dimensions (particularly if these dimensions have been shown to matter in other               
work, Brown et al., 2014). When theorizing, we often disregard the specificity of studies.              
There is one exception to this rule: If there is some other single study that proves that a                  
given setting mattered, we may revise the theory to now predict this difference (which gives               
enormous weight to that result); or we may instead argue against the validity of that result so                 
as to avoid changing our theory. This exception aside, though, most of the time absence of                
evidence of a methodological or population-specific effect is implicitly taken as evidence of             
absence: Each theory is as general as it can be given the extant evidence.  
Second, single studies are always a noisy window into reality. The best case scenario is that                
results are misleading because of our inferential tools, which allow some proportion of false              
positives and negatives to seep into the literature. For instance, imagine that we have a               
single study documenting some effect that was interpreted to support a theory, and a second               
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study fails to document the same effect. In this example, either study can be misleading.               
How do we decide between these contrary findings?  
One option is to do study comparison by assessing the distance between replications and              
the original study: Perhaps the second study did not employ exactly the same setting but               
should have been considered as a conceptual replication, which may lead to theory             
modification as discussed in the previous paragraph. Alternatively, the second study may            
have been designed to be as similar as possible to the original one (i.e., an "exact"                
replication), in which case it could still yield a negative result just because our statistical tools                
allow a certain proportion of false negative results. This scenario is less unlikely than we               
habitually treat it: The traditional cut-offs built in our traditional statistical practices would             
allow for as much as 5% of false positives and 20% of false negatives. However, the                
situation is even more complex in a realistic scenario, because it is not the case that the                 
literature accurately reflects all findings. Indeed, extant literature (and any single study in it)              
may be misleading because of questionable research practices, which are still eminently            
difficult to eradicate (Scheel, Schijen, & Lakens, 2020). 
The above two shortcomings of single studies could, in theory, be addressed by designing              
future single studies with more variation in setting and sample in mind. An attempt to this                
end are large-scale collaborations in which multiple laboratories agree to collect data on a              
single phenomenon (henceforth large-scale replications -- because the data gathered by           
each laboratory can be viewed as a replication of that collected by another laboratory in the                
same study). Large-scale replications are addressed in the next section.  
Before turning to this approach, we want to discuss a third, fundamentally conceptual,             
shortcoming of relying on single studies for theory evaluation. Advancing scientific           
knowledge relies on cumulative knowledge, which allows us to change, advance, and refine             
any given theory. As mentioned above, if we rely on a single study for theory evaluation,                
there is no principled way to decide how to integrate the findings of another (past or future)                 
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single study into this theory. Indeed, without a systematic way to build knowledge             
cumulatively, there are three potential outcomes when new single observations oppose the            
results of the previous data. First, we can say we failed to find support for the theory -- thus,                   
a single negative finding leads to discarding a whole general statement. Second, we may try               
to do away with the uncomfortable result -- but the long term consequence of such a                
decision would be that no data can update our beliefs. Third, if the result is somewhat                
compatible with a theory, we can change the theory even if it becomes more complex or                
abstract, which is fairly easy since most current theories are narratives. This leads to              
increased complexity of theories, making them in the long run unfalsifiable and impossible to              
compare to each other.  
To make this more concrete, consider the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis (henceforth TWH,           
Trivers & Willard, 1973), originally postulated to explain the fact that, in some species, the               
sex ratio will be different for individuals with low versus high access to resources (relatively               
more female offspring the lower the resources are). This theory was first expanded to more               
species, and eventually even to post-birth events, such as parental investment. In Freese             
and Powell (1999), the authors found no evidence that American parents invested differently             
in girls versus boys as a function of socio-economic status when looking at a variety of                
questions in a national questionnaire, and thus suggested they found no evidence for TWH              
-- this is akin to abandoning the theory. A commentary by Kanazawa (2001) contested              
several of the questions bore on ​educational ​investment, which would at best affect earnings              
and status, and thus would determine reproductive success only of the boys, and not of the                
girls -- this is the third strategy we discussed, which is changing the theory slightly: TWH                
does not govern ​all parental investment, but only that investment that parents can trace back               
as determining sex-general reproductive success. In their reply to the commentary, Freese            
and Powell (2001) countered Kanazawa's arguments in a variety of ways, leading up to a               
basic objection:  
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"We object because we think that plainly, had we found patterns consistent with the              
hypothesis for [specific] measures, this would have been taken as support for TWH.             
Evolutionary psychological arguments supporting this proposal are easily devised:         
investments in daughter’s [sic] capacity to gain resources and status could be            
interpreted as facilitating her acquisition of the best possible mate or promoting the             
welfare of her offspring. Or, because modern higher education has absolutely no            
analogue in the Pleistocene, investment in it could have been taken as governed by              
the same unconscious mechanisms of parental love as other behaviors, rather than            
being governed by a separate mechanism dedicated to status-linked investment. Or,           
even if educational investments were just partly governed by a desire to “take care”              
of one’s children, this could still be interpreted as implying the observation of the              
interaction effect that is predicted by the TWH, in addition to the ​main effect of a                
general sex-specific bias." [emphasis in the original, pp. 1778-9] 
In other words, they object to the infinite creativity of theorizers to reshape theories in ever                
more minute ways, to make them fit to the results seen in specific variables. ​In sum, if we                  
want to actually ​let the evidence decide ​, this isolated view of single datapoints is neither               
correct nor productive.  
Large-scale replications 
Recent years have seen the rise of cross-laboratory replications, which address several            
weaknesses we highlighted in the context of single studies (a good set of proposals in this                
direction is found in Uhlmann et al., 2019). In particular, initiatives like the "Many Labs"               
efforts (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Klein et al., 2018) can address both the              
over-specificity and the noisiness of single studies. When many labs collect data on a given               
phenomenon using largely the same experimental procedure they are varying more the            
experimenter identity, and increasing sample diversity, which already contributes to a greater            
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trust in the likelihood of the study generalizing to a new sample collected by a new                
experimenter. Their larger sample sizes also reduce the chance of observing both false             
positives and false negatives through their greater precision. Such studies are typically more             
trustworthy because analyses are usually pre-registered, and data are open, allowing           
correction of any analytic judgment error that may have occurred. However, to our             
knowledge these collaboration efforts have not yet gone so far to vary methodological             
parameters systematically (major exceptions are the radical randomization approach of all           
moderators described by Baribault et al., 2018; and the large-scale study of the ManyBabies              
Consortium, 2020, where three different data collection methods were used, but otherwise            
the stimuli and analysis pipeline were the same across 69 labs in a conceptual replication of                
a key phenomenon in developmental science). 
Thus, most of these collaborations limit the range of methodological variation to maintain             
status as direct cross-lab replication, which still means that they provide a single datum              
localized to one specific region in methodological space. Put differently, once the data are              
collected, they are very often reducible to a single point (with a great deal of weight, but still                  
a single point). In other words, while large-scale replications evaluate the robustness of a              
specific methodological test against (some) population diversity, they cannot speak to           
generalizability. However, as suggested by Uhlmann et al. (2019) and Baribault et al. (2018),              
this weakness of large-scale collaboration might be ameliorated in the future, pending            
practical feasibility. 
Unfortunately, even in that case, large-scale replications still suffer from the conceptual            
weakness of single studies mentioned above. Thus, even if they provide robust data across              
populations and experimental parameters on a specific phenomenon, large scale          
replications still do not replace a framework for the integration of possibly contradicting data              
in the process of theory evaluation and development. 
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Qualitative reviews 
Qualitative reviews seem to offer a solution to the above-mentioned conceptual weakness            
of single studies and large-scale replications, by providing a framework to weave together             
multiple single studies. Indeed, probably the most common form of theory development            
involves (a form of) qualitative reviews, in which ideas are linked up to extant empirical               
literature. We emphasize that qualitative reviews can differ in their systematicity and            
subjectiveness: A systematic qualitative review based on standardized search protocols and           
procedures could avoid, to a certain extent, the problems we list below. However, the              
non-systematic qualitative review we refer to is the prevalent form of evidence integration, as              
it is usually part of the introduction and/or discussion of an experimental paper, or is               
presented in invited submissions. As a result, such evaluations are often not peer-reviewed             
independently. Moreover, qualitative reviews authored by prominent researchers come with          
a stamp of individual approval which makes it hard to contest the text without also appearing                
to attack the author -- which makes the absence of appropriate peer review all the more                
problematic.  
We believe the first major shortcoming of qualitative reviews is the fact that data selection is                
not done in an overt and transparent way. By including only some studies and not others,                
review authors tacitly give the impression that the extant evidence is clear and important. For               
instance, authors in qualitative reviews do not overtly declare how they checked for quality              
and absence of bias in the studies cited. In our opinion, they do care about quality and bias,                  
and they do select studies to weed out the "bad" ones, but by not declaring how they made                  
this decision, authors of qualitative reviews open that same selection process to the authors'              
own biases. In fact, despite the author's best intentions, the procedure whereby a qualitative              
review is put together is fraught with occasions for biases to seep in, including data and                
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outcome selection. A clear, honest, and self-reflective account of how this may happen can              
be found in Bishop (2020).  
The second shortcoming of qualitative reviews was already alluded to, when discussing how             
authors who rely on single study interpretation and narrativization can iron out apparent             
discrepancies. As a result, it is possible to tell almost any story when stringing together               
studies. Here, we can think again of the discussion around how to interpret the American               
parental investment data with respect to TWH: The original authors had selected all             
questions related to parental investment and found overall no support; their detractor            
weeded out variables he argued were less useful, and found an effect in one question he                
thought was better, and produced a narrative to argue for this; and the original authors' reply                
countered that this amounted to a combination of cherry-picking and theory sculpting.            
Indeed, this practice has been criticized in the context of the "replication crisis" as HARKing               
(hypothesizing after results are known, Kerr, 1998). 
More generally, the second major shortcoming of qualitative reviews is the lack of framework              
for quantitative evaluation and comparison. Sometimes, authors of qualitative reviews do           
attempt to take into account a body of evidence with heterogeneous results. But it becomes               
quickly obvious that, in narrative terms, it is hard to appropriately deal with this. Authors may                
produce a table summarizing the studies, with a column tagging with + or - (or even 0)                 
studies depending on whether they support a conclusion or not. This entails making a              
decision of what constitutes a "+" -- is it a significant result, and does the direction of the                  
effect matter? Is it a result that is numerically in the "right" direction? In any case, the author                  
now is forced to say "evidence is disparate", or do vote counting of "+" -- which leads back to                   
the question of how many votes should align, or what proportion, or how to integrate studies                
of e.g. different sizes and/or qualities. For example, authors may choose to exclude, weigh              
and single point, or count as overwhelming evidence results of large-scale replications. In             
sum, what is the threshold for deciding that the evidence aligns one way or another? This                
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method is even more impractical in the case of theoretically relevant and/or methodological             
moderators that are suspected of having a major effect. Verbally postulating them based on              
diverging outcomes is not good scientific practice because it amounts to saying there is a               
"significant" difference without testing for it. 
The final reason why qualitative reviews are the most pernicious is related to the previous               
two points: There is no procedure for deciding that there is ​enough ​evidence. Often, a single                
study will be considered as enough. If there are diverging results, the author of a qualitative                
review may be happy to notice 4 out of 5 studies go in a certain direction. But they may also                    
be particularly convinced by the study that is different from the others, leading them to               
conclude that "evidence is mixed". When do review authors state that "there is not enough               
evidence" or, even less common, "not the right evidence"? Our impression is that we do this                
when we have thought of a certain experimental setting for which there is ​no data at all ​,                 
again reflecting the single-study-is-decisive assumption. 
Our proposal: CAMAs 
Many of the criticisms we leveraged against single studies (including large-scale           
replications) and qualitative reviews will sound old to our readers. Indeed, these same issues              
are what have motivated a push towards systematic reviews and meta-analyses in many             
fields, including psychology, where leading journals invite submissions of meta-analyses          
(including ​Perspectives in Psychological Science ​). The detailed procedures that have been           
laid down to guide systematic reviews and meta-analyses (e.g., PRISMA, Moher et al., 2009;              
Shamseer et al., 2015) can help us counter our selection biases, overtly report quality              
judgments, and use objective and quantitative methods for study weighing and moderator            
tests. Moreover, a range of tools can be used in this framework to deal with heterogeneous                
data in an integrated view, and even check for bias in the field as a whole (e.g., Sterne et al.,                    
2005).  
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Against this backdrop, we proposed open, community-augmented meta-analyses        
(henceforth CAMAs; Tsuji, Bergmann, & Cristia, 2014) as a way to further improve on this               
already powerful approach. Specifically, we proposed that all stages of screening, inclusion,            
qualitative, and quantitative analyses, as well as the resulting data and scripts, be made              
public and open, with procedures for the community to suggest improvements and updates,             
signaling for instance missing studies or errors in the data. Of course, meta-analyses are not               
perfect (Ioannidis, 2016), and recent investigations into the transparency and reproducibility           
of meta-analyses revealed considerable issues (Polanin, Hennessy & Tsuji, 2020; Maassen           
et al., 2020). This makes sense: no tool can force its handler to use it wisely.  
However, our open CAMAs allow community members to detect and even correct many             
such problems at relatively low cost. Moreover, even perfectly transparent and reproducible            
meta-analyses start aging the moment they are drawn up, often even before the paper is               
submitted, let alone published. CAMAs make it possible for community members to rescue             
meta-analyses from such deterioration, and thus make traditional meta-analyses compatible          
with a cumulative approach to empirical science. 
As a whole, then, CAMAs are in principle the only way in which theory evaluation can be                 
done overtly using all available data, and prevents the subjective data selection and fitting              
that qualitative reviews allow. Indeed, this is the only method in which methodological             
"noise" can be overtly and statistically modeled, as follows. If there is sufficient data on the                
different methods, then we will be able to separately measure the phenomenon of interest              
and the effect of the method. On the contrary, if several variables are confounded, or if there                 
is too little data to measure such effects with certainty, then we should in all honesty accept                 
that we cannot measure the phenomenon separately from the methodological "noise". This            
may relate to problems of external validity and generalizability of results.  
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Potential roadblocks 
What may hold people back from using CAMAs for theory evaluation? We believe for this               
framework to be truly useful, we also need to fundamentally change how we build              
meta-analyses and how we analyze them.  
Most often, meta-analyses in psychology are built around a phenomenon, often to check             
whether evidence for it exists, such as "does extra-sensory perception exist?" (Kennedy,            
2013) or "does romantic priming exist?" (Shanks et al., 2015). In the case of interventions,               
we may be curious about what kind of features of the intervention are most decisive in terms                 
of our likelihood to see an effect (e.g., Humpston et al., 2020). In all of these cases, we                  
select studies and code them with a particular question in mind, which determines both the               
moderators that are tabulated and the dependent measures, ignoring any factors or            
measures that we do not think will matter for our key question. Come analysis time, we                
check whether our phenomenon "is there or not" and whether a factor "matters or not". If one                 
stops to think about it, this is once again binomial reading rearing its ugly head, now treating                 
a meta-analysis as if it were a single study, with a focus on strict significance. Not                
surprisingly, one of the most common informed criticisms of meta-analyses in recent times             
point to the degrees of freedom of the meta-analyst, and the fact that we don't check for                 
power, nor protect ourselves from false positives due to repeated testing (e.g., Watt &              
Kennedy, 2017;  Moreau & Gamble, 2020, Pigott, 2020). 
Instead, we propose a more ambitious but much richer approach to meta-analyses. The             
community-augmented and dynamic approach we propose prevents the systematization of          
data by one specific (group of) researchers on one specific phenomenon at one specific              
point in time. We go even further by proposing to systematize data based on the basic                
method and population rather than a specific phenomenon. We have done this in the past,               
looking at sound discrimination (Tsuji & Cristia, 2013) and word segmentation (Bergmann &             
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Cristia, 2016) in infants. These datasets then allowed us to answer many questions including              
whether two different types of sound representation predicted infants' sound discrimination           
(Tsuji & Cristia, 2017), and even combining data across meta-analyses to inspect the             
timeline of development of sound and word processing (Bergmann et al., 2017).            
(Incidentally, by compiling the literature independently from a specific research question, we            
suspect meta-analysts will probably be less biased, but we have not checked this.) Notice              
furthermore that this approach increases the re-usability of meta-analyses, and these two            
meta-analyses have since been incorporated in a much larger collaborative project           
(Bergmann et al., 2018).  
As a result, another benefit of this approach is that it provides an alternative to the current                 
state of affairs where two different teams studying the exact same phenomenon with a              
meta-analytic approach arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions (see discussion in Watt           
& Kennedy, 2017). We can imagine a future in which it will become normal to enter data into                  
extant broad meta-analyses as part of one's BA and MA training in psychology, thus              
completely separating data entry from theory testing. Similarly, coursework could include           
papers based on meta-analyses as a complement to the papers published in top tier              
journals, which may or may not prove replicable, robust, or generalizable in the future.              
Indeed, Munafo and Flint (2010) finds that studies in lower impact journals provide a more               
accurate estimate of effect size than studies published in higher impact journals.  
When we have explained this idea in the past, some listeners countered that this large-scale               
approach is not appropriate for theory evaluation because a single experiment, through a set              
of associated controls, can try to isolate one factor and thus appropriately isolate a single               
phenomenon. In contrast, a meta-analysis as conceived above may collapse across many            
methodologies. To make this more precise, our sound discrimination meta-analysis contains           
data from psychophysiological methods including functional Near InfraRed Spectroscopy         
and electroencephalograhy, as well as behavioral measures of preference (central fixation,           
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head turn preference) and conditioned behavior methods (high amplitude sucking,          
conditioned head turn). Detractors can ask: How can you look at discrimination when there is               
all this variation? Our answer is that even when we don't use a meta-analytic tool, we are still                  
faced with all that variation. The belief that by focusing on a single data point this                
methodological variation goes away is merely an optical trick, an attentional error. In fact, by               
using a meta-analysis, we can try to overtly account for this variation: Rather than focusing               
our attention on a single point, we can incorporate "method" as a fixed effect, and thus                
statistically control for its effect. We argue that, contrary to initial impressions, meta-analyses             
are more suitable because ​they force us to consider that variability​. Indeed, if one method is                
more or less suited to test, in this example, discrimination, we should become aware of this                
through meta-regressions analyzing method effects. 
Still, our (imagined) detractor insists, now all studies are lumped together -- including studies              
from my lab (where things are done right) and my enemy's lab (where things are done                
wrong), and my friend's lab (where things are done more or less well). In fact, the evaluation                 
of evidence ​quality ​done in traditional reviews does have a parallel in meta-analyses, except              
that in a meta-analysis it is done overtly, transparently, and in a manner allowing quantitative               
analyses. Some procedures exist for classifying data points; for example, by treating            
differently double-blind randomized control trials as opposed to correlational research (e.g.,           
Armijo-Olivo et al., 2015). For experimental research, it is possible and desirable to try to               
develop standards that allow us to check data quality in terms of overtly defined criteria (see                
Tsuji et al., 2020, for an attempt for infant experimental research). Remember further that              
weighing of individual data points is routinely employed in meta-analyses, as are checks for              
whether data from published versus unpublished sources is systematically different. Thus,           
the tools already exist to do this type of analysis: One can weigh points based on                
hypothetical indices of data quality from a given lab, or test whether a categorical              
classification explains significant variance. In sum, our conclusions in the framework of a             
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meta-analysis can thus capture stability in the direction and strength of effects, taking into              
account all the methodological and qualitative variables that we believe are reasonable to             
specify. 
A final counter-argument we have come across is that meta-analyses do not have the right               
data or level of granularity to evaluate theories. Often, we then hear "because for this               
question there is only one study". At this point, of course, readers may already feel the                
answer emerging, since this is also an optical trick. If there are not enough data points to                 
check for generalizability, how can we trust them (or it) to tell us generalizable facts about                
psychological phenomena? More importantly, thinking cumulatively, we realize it is not a            
question of the ​number of studies per se. Even three studies may provide strong evidence               
when they align perfectly, especially when they are highly powered, whereas thirty studies             
might not lead to any strong conclusions either way, particularly when they contain high              
variance and small samples. As a result, it is not possible to set specific thresholds whereby                
we can say that results are believable. Once again, the advantage of using a methodology               
that is 50 years old is that these questions have been visited already. Meta-analytic methods               
incorporate measures of heterogeneity, to see to what extent studies' results align; and of              
power, to assess whether data are sufficient to detect an effect of a given size. If it is found                   
that data are heterogeneous or that power is lacking, we can now state confidently that more                
work is needed -- and we can even estimate how much of it! Once again, then, careful                 
reflection reveals that meta-analytic approaches will always be preferable to qualitative           
theory evaluation.  
Moving forward: How to integrate single (small- and large-scale) studies          
and qualitative reviews into cumulative science 
While the previous sections might give the impression that we recommend abandoning            
single studies and qualitative reviews altogether, our intended message is quite the contrary.             
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We illustrated that CAMAs are the only feasible tool for theory evaluation in the age of                
cumulative science, but other approaches have their place in the scientific process. Indeed,             
we are convinced that CAMAs help other approaches to gain renewed importance. 
Let us first turn to single studies. In fact, CAMAs cannot exist and evolve without the input                 
provided by single studies. By virtue of being integrated in a CAMA, single studies gain a                
meaningful place in the cumulative process of theory evaluation. Researchers planning a            
novel study on a given topic could first consult a corresponding CAMA to identify the               
objective and quantitative gaps in the literature. Depending on the results of this             
investigation, different study designs and theory modifications might result. For instance, our            
meta-analysis of sound discrimination (Tsuji & Cristia, 2014) revealed that there is not             
enough quantitative evidence for concluding that non-native speech sound discrimination          
significantly decreases over the first year of life. A lab could therefore decide to collect new                
data to test this phenomenon in a language that, again revealed by CAMA, has not yet been                 
assessed. Another example is our meta-analysis on phonotactic learning (Cristia, 2019),           
which collected laboratory experiments in which infants were exposed to sound sequences.            
There were many such studies, following essentially the same method and all published as              
supporting the theory that prelinguistic infants can learn sound sequences after brief            
exposure. However, the meta-analysis revealed an effect of zero, strongly suggesting that            
the phenomenon was not reliable because opposite effects were sometimes observed within            
the same lab with nearly identical methods. This should lead to changing the technique              
(using longer exposures, or habituating the child to the pattern), or potentially of the theory               
stating that infants do learn sound sequences from brief exposure:. Perhaps humans can             
only learn sound sequences much later, after we start talking.  
Of course, to follow cumulative practice, such studies are not only inspired by a CAMA, but,                
after data collection, their results also need to be integrated into one to adequately interpret               
the results.  
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Note that for each of the studies we propose, the researcher’s interpretation of the              
observation that meta-analytic results contradict a previous theory may play a role in study              
choice. In the first case, it is likely that the researcher still thinks the theory is true, but wants                   
to contribute more data to increase statistical power. In the second case, the researcher              
might think the method is flawed or the theory is not true, and thus starts a different type of                   
study to cumulate evidence on alternative hypotheses. While such researcher decisions           
might lead to bias in CAMAs - such as having much more evidence for one than another                 
aspect of a theory - a CAMA reveals, in an objective and transparent way, how many and                 
how precise studies it includes on a certain aspect, and would thus invite self-correction              
further down the road. 
Another counterargument to this new role we propose for single studies is that many might               
consider the first type of single study example - where new data is gathered to support a                 
theory that is fairly established based in the field based on narrative reviews, even though a                
meta-analysis fails to find an effect - as too unambitious and unexciting. However, we are               
convinced that in order for Science to be exciting, it needs to rest on solid ground, and that                  
building this solid ground is actually a very ambitious endeavor. We are therefore advocating              
for a change in attitude towards this kind of study. At the same time, we acknowledge that                 
such work might (still) be harder to publish, and might be most efficiently done in the context                 
of the above-mentioned student projects, or as a first step during a PhD program. As a                
student project, even if only a small sample has been collected that will not lead to                
independent publication, the cumulative nature of a CAMA allows to weigh such a sample              
adequately and integrate it as a meaningful piece of evidence. In addition to that, the study                
proposed does not prevent researchers from adding in novel, unattested conditions (for            
instance whether certain perinatal conditions affect sensitivity to non-native speech); and           
thus theory evaluation and proposing new hypotheses can go hand in hand. Importantly,             
though, the datapoint generated on the novel, more fine-grained question of the effect of              
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perinatal conditions must be seen as the starting point of a new cumulative endeavor, with               
more studies necessary to build a solid base of evidence.  
Yet another concern might be the role of single studies as published papers and their               
impactfulness. We acknowledge that publishing (a small series of) single studies is still the              
modus operandi for the majority of labs. We can thus see two write-up strategies in the                
example above. One option is to forefront the cumulative part of the results, presenting the               
CAMA as motivating the study design, reporting on the data collected, and presenting as              
main result the overall updated CAMA effect size for non-native discrimination, with the             
novel part (the effect of perinatal factors) as exploratory since it is based on a single data                 
point. This might seem unalluring, and many of our colleagues would probably write up the               
same study forefronting the exploratory result (if it was significant), and perhaps not even              
looking at the updated CAMA results, in the hope of having a story that reviewers and                
editors will enjoy reading. We again advocate for a change in attitude towards a cumulative               
vision of science, but realize that the burden cannot be born by the individual researcher in                
the current context of publications. Therefore, we propose a compromise: it is possible to              
emphasize the importance of the novel component in the point, while admitting that it is               
exploratory, and calling for more work on that same topic to both signal the importance of                
cumulativity all the while writing a compelling article.  
Finally, a researcher might have a novel hypothesis for which no suitable previous CAMA              
exists. We do by no means want to discourage this researcher from running a (series of)                
single studies to test this hypothesis. We want to stress, however, that the role of this new                 
study cannot be to prove or disprove a theory, but to propose an idea that can then serve as                   
a starting point for a new cumulative research endeavor.  
In this new scenario, what is the place of qualitative reviews? We have argued that papers'                
introductions should rely more on CAMAs than qualitative reviews in their motivation; we             
have also spoken against stand-alone qualitative reviews in the context of evaluating            
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theories against extant data, because they are so inferior to CAMAs in that role (see Table                
1). But notice that qualitative reviews still have an unmatched strength against the other two               
options, namely that they can tease apart conceptual factors better than the two other              
methods. Indeed, we believe that qualitative reviews may be ideal to develop theories             
conceptually unfettered by the existence or strength of empirical theory. We recognize,            
however, that it may be difficult for authors to publish conceptual expositions without making              
reference to data, as editors, reviewers, and readers will be used to seeing dichotomies set               
up, with data used to rule for or against one of the options. Nonetheless, we argue that this                  
another weakness in the publication system, which can be dealt with in a similarly pragmatic               
manner as single studies: As writers, editors, reviewers, and readers of qualitative reviews,             
we should value them most for the clarity of the conceptualization, and not for how they                
purport to make contact with empirical data (unless they do so via CAMAs). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered traditional ways of evaluating theories (ranging from broad              
frameworks to implemented models), and concluded that none of them are appropriate in the              
current age of cumulative science. Specifically, considering single studies in isolation           
(including large-scale collaboration) as well as weaving together single studies in a            
qualitative review both suffer from selection biases and inappropriate sampling of the space             
of possibilities. We have instead proposed that meta-analyses based on rigorous systematic            
reviews, particularly open, community-augmented meta-analyses (CAMAs), are always        
preferable. Note that they still require the person using a meta-analysis for theory evaluation              
to have a clear mind about what the theory states, what its key concepts are, and what                 
reasonable implementations of those concepts are. Thus, the fun work of theory evaluation             
still needs to happen. 
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Are CAMAs perfect? We suspect no, because CAMAs still rely on extant literature, and thus               
flaws in the literature can be carried over. Although as meta-analysts we have a few tools in                 
our kit to deal with imperfection (tests for biases in the literature, heterogeneity, and power;               
systematic evaluation of methodological and other quality factors), the result of the CAMA is              
still bounded by the quality of the underlying literature.  
The realization of the power of CAMAs also sheds new light on how new data collection                
should be approached. If we are guided by a cumulative mindset both with respect to theory                
and data, then we should come to do experiments differently. For instance, instead of trying               
to isolate conditions in such a way that the result can only be observed in that setting, and                  
even a minimal change (the identity of the experimenter) prevents replication, we may collect              
data purposefully varying dimensions we believe not to be relevant theoretically, in order to              
better sample the space of possibilities, and end up with results that are more replicable,               
robust, and easier to interpret in a general way. We look forward to a new generation of                 
psychologists that cumulatively build on previous work by both creating systematic reviews            
of previous work, and approaching data collection and theory construction with this novel             
lens. 
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